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Case No. 20130842-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of endangerment
of a child, third degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
The issue in this case is whether a father can avoid responsibility for
his 10-year-old child's use of methamphetamine and marijuana merely
because he was sleeping when his child helped himself to his drug supply.
When the father is awake, he routinely gives his child marijuana, uses
methamphetamine and marijuana in front of him, allows his friends to use
these drugs in front of his child, leaves paraphernalia lying out in the open,
and keeps the drugs where his child can easily find and access them.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Father's motion for a directed
verdict where there was sufficient evidence to establish that Father
intentionally or knowingly caused or permitted 10-year-old Son to be
exposed to, ingest, or inhale controlled substances and drug paraphernalia?

Standard of Review for Issue 1. When reviewing a claim of insufficient
evidence, an appellate court "will uphold the trial court's denial of a motion
for directed verdict ... if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences
that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime
had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Harrison, 2012 UT
App 261, ,r10, 286 P.3d 1272, cert. denied, 298 P.3d 69 (Utah 2013) (alterations,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Montoya,
2004 UT 5, if 29, 84 P.3d 1183).
2.

Following Father's conviction of two counts of child

endangern1ent, Father moved to arrest the judgment, alleging that one of
the State's witnesses had gone into the jury room during deliberations.
Father submitted four affidavits in support of his motion, but none of the
affiants saw or heard the State's witness go into the jury room. The State
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submitted a counter affidavit where the witness denied going into the jury
room.
Did the trial court properly deny Father's motion to arrest judgment
when he presented no evidence that a State witness had any contact with
thejury?

Standard of Review for Issue 2. "We review a trial court's ruling on a
motion [to arrest judgment] under an abuse of discretion standard. At the
same time, however, we review ... the trial court's factual findings for clear
error."

State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, if9, 311 P.3d 995 (alterations in

original and internal quotation marks omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
• Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West Supp. 2012) (Culpable mental state
definitions)
• Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (West Supp. 2013) (Endangerment of a
child)
• Utah R. Crim. P. 4 (Prosecution of Public Offenses)
• Utah R. App. P. 24 (Briefs)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. . Summary offacts. 1

"I thought it would be cool if I did it."
In February 2012, ten-year-old "Son" was living with the defendant,
his "Father." R.175:9-10, 11. Although they were the only two who lived
there, Father's many friends and girlfriends frequented the home. R.175:1014.

"[A]lmost everybody that came over to [the] house" used drugs,
including Father, Father's friends, and girlfriends.

R.175:12-13.

They

favored marijuana and methamphetamine and would use these drugs in
front of Son. R.175:12-14. Son discussed the drugs with Father and Father's
friends, and asked the1n questions such as what meth "smelled like and
what meth also looked like when they were breathing it out." R.175:14.
Father answered Son's questions. R.175:14. But Father did not tell Son
about the dangers of drugs or what they could do to his body. R.175:27-28.
Father also sold meth from the home and Son "knew it." R.175:15.

1

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light
most favorable to the jury's verdict and conflicting evidence is presented
only as needed to understand the issues raised on appeal. See State v.

Kruger, 2000 UT 60, if 2, 6 P.3d 1116.
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Son likewise used drugs with Father's consent.

Father gave Son

1narijuana at least 25 to 30 times. R.175:13. Father advised Son not to get
caught with the drugs because it would get Father in trouble. R.175:25.
Father's friends also gave Son drugs and drug paraphernalia.

R.175:15, 21, 53. Father's friend Shane gave Son meth and a "red mushroom
pipe." R.175:15, 21. Son tried the meth at least twice. R.175:15. He tried it
"[b]ecause "I was curious and I wanted to know what it was like because I
thought it would be cool if I did it." R.175:15-16. Using meth gave Son a
"'[g]ood feeling" and made him" feel cool." R.175:16.
Son told one of Father's friends that he was smoking meth. R.175:44-

45. This friend informed Father of Son's meth use. Id. Father later "yelled"
at Son for using meth. R.175:44-45, 52-53. But Father did not stop giving
Son marijuana, did not stop using drugs in Son's presence, did not stop
inviting drugs users to his home, did not remove drugs or drug
paraphernalia from the home, and did not lock up his drugs or otherwise
keep them where Son could not access them. R.175:17-20, 54.
On the evening of February 6, 2012, Father gave Son marijuana.

R.175:54. Son did not go to bed that night, but instead stayed up all night.
R.175:34. At about 3:00 or 4:00 a.m., Son decided that he wanted more
drugs. R.175:17, 34. He found a meth pipe on a counter in the front room
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and took it. R.175:20. Knowing there would be more drugs in Father's
room, Son went there. R.175:17-18, 32, 34. Father was asleep in his bed with
a "girlfriend," a woman Son did not know. R.175:18, 33. A lamp was on.

R.175:33. Son "went straight to [a] drawer" in a bureau by Father's bed
"[b]ecause I knew that he would have it" there. R.175:17, 34. Son found
marijuana in a container in the drawer. R.175:17-18. Son also found meth
on a lid to a container in the drawer. R.175:18-19, 34. Son took both drugs.

R.175:19-20, 35.
Son also looked inside the girlfriend's purse lying on the floor in front
of the bed. R.175:18, 32, 36. Inside, Son found marijuana, meth, and a meth
pipe, which he also took. R.175:18, 20, 38-39. He did not think it was wrong
to take them. R.175:41.
Son then took the meth pipes and all the drugs back to his bedroom.

R.175:19, 42-43.

Using the meth pipe from the girlfriend's purse, Son

smoked some of the meth. R.175:19, 43. Carefully holding a lighter to the
pipe, Son took care not to burn the bottom. R.175:20-21. Son then s111oked
some of the marijuana, using the "red mushroom pipe" that Father's friend
Shane had given him. R.175:15, 21.
Son later walked to his elementary school for the school day.

R.175:46.

He took the red mushroom pipe, a lighter, the remaining
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marijuana, and some tinfoil with him.2 R.175:21-22, 46. On the way, Son
smoked more marijuana. R.175:22. At school, he went into the secondgrade bathroom and smoked yet more marijuana. R.175:22, 47.
The police responded to the elementary school after a second-grader
smelled smoke in the bathroom. R.175:23, 47-48. The police took Son to the
hospital where he tested positive for both meth and marijuana. R.175:26-27,
61-64; State's Ex.1.

At the hospital, Son admitted to police that he had

gotten the meth and marijuana from his home. R.175:27.
Father came to the hospital and was questioned by police. R.175:71.
An officer noticed the strong aroma of marijuana coming from Father and
asked him about his drug use. R.175:72. Father admitted that he had just
smoked marijuana and that he uses meth as well. R.175:73. Father also
admitted that it was possible that Son could have found marijuana and
meth in his home. R.175:73-74.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Father was charged with tvvo counts of endangerment of a child and
the case went to trial. R.1-3, R.175. The statutory elements that the State
was required to prove were that Father (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2)
caused or permitted Son, (3) to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have
2

Son did not testify where he got the tinfoil, but stated that he had
found the lighter at a friend's house. R.175:43.
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contact with a controlled substance or paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp. 2012). The information alleged that the conduct
for both counts occurred "on or about February 7, 2012." R.1-3.

Motion for dfrected verdict
At the close of the State's case, Father moved for a directed verdict on
both counts. R.175:81. Father argued that the State had not met its burden
on element two - "caused or permitted" - because the drugs were hidden in
his drawer and in his girlfriend's purse. R.175:81-82. Father reasoned that
because Son "was sneaking around trying not to wake up whoever was
sleeping in the bed, [it] certainly shows he does not have permission to be
doing what he was doing." R.175:83.
The State countered that the drugs "were exactly where [Son] knew
they would be from watching the defendant use drugs and store his drugs
in the past. That's a common sense definition of permitting." R.175:82.
The trial court denied Father's motion, finding "there has been
sufficient evidence presented from which a jury accurately and reasonably
could convict the defendant. ... " R.175:84; R.128. (A copy of the arguments
and the trial court's oral ruling, R.175:81-84, is attached at Addendum D).
The trial court submitted the case to the jury, which convicted Father
on both counts. R.175:108.
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Motion to arrest judgment
After trial, but before sentencing, Father moved to arrest judgment on
the sole ground that one of the State's trial witnesses had improper contact
with the jury. R.147-150.
Father submitted four affidavits from trial attendees who stated that
they heard the bailiff tell a State's witness - the testifying officer - that the
jury had a question for him. R.149, 152-156. (A copy of Father's motion and
supporting affidavits is attached at Addendum E). The affidavits further
stated that the officer then went with the bailiff through a door by the jury
box. Id., R.176:3.
The State submitted a counter affidavit from an investigator with the
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. R.176:3, R.157-159. (A copy is
attached at Addendum F).

The investigator interviewed the testifying

officer and the bailiff. R.157. Both denied to the investigator that the officer
had any contact with the jury. R.157-159. The officer stated that "he had
not spoken to any member of the jury in this case at any time." R.158. He
explained that he had gone through the door by the jury box with the bailiff
to check the status of a warrant at a court clerk's work station. Id. The
bailiff had assisted the officer. Id.
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The bailiff verified to the investigator that he had checked the status
of a warrant at a clerk's work station. R.159. He further stated that he knew
"for a certainty" that he did not allow the officer to speak with the jury.
R.158. The bailiff declared he would never permit such contact because it
violates the "rules of conduct." Id.
The investigator noted that Father's affidavits were from Father's
family members who had been waiting in the courtroom while the jury
deliberated. 3 R.157.
After reviewing the affidavits, the trial court asked whether Father
wanted an evidentiary hearing. Father stated that he did not:
The Court: I have received documents from both sides. Does
any - do either party believe an evidentiary hearing or
anything further is needed?
[State]: No, your Honor.
[Father's counsel]: No, your Honor. The Court received the
affidavit submitted, I guess, two weeks ago?
The Court: Yes, I've reviewed all that and I've received from
the State as well.
[Father's counsel]: So I would submit it on the motion I filed as
well as the affidavits.
The Court: All right. Thank you.
3

Father's presentence report also lists one of the affiants, Bianca
Kinney, as Father's live-in fiancee. R.137.
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Q

R.176:3.
The trial court took judicial notice that the door indicated in Father's
affidavits did not lead into the jury room, but into a hallway.

R.176:3.

Father did not object. Id. The court then denied Father's motion as lacking
factual support:
There is no evidence of contact between the witness and the
jury, only evidence that the witness utilized the same door that
the jury has used. So here, no evidence of unauthorized
conduct is present. The witnesses who had direct personal
knowledge testified that no contact between the [testifying
officer] and the jury took place. . . . So the Court finds that
there's no evidence of improper jury contact that was made,
and so there's no presumption, prejudice attaching to that and
as such I'm denying the motion.
R.176:4. (A copy of the trial court's oral ruling, R.176:3-4, is attached at
Addendum G).
The court sentenced Father to two concurrent prison terms of zero-tofive years. R.176:8; R.160. Father timely appealed. R.168-169; R.170-172.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I:

The trial court correctly denied Father's motion for a directed

verdict because the evidence was more than sufficient to prove all the
statutory elements of at least two counts of child endangerment: that Father
knowingly or intentionally caused or permitted Son to be exposed to, to
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ingest or inhale, or to have contact with drugs or paraphernalia.

This

evidence included that Father and his friends regularly used marijuana and
meth in front of Son. Father gave Son marijuana 25 to 30 times-most
recently on February 6, 2012. On February 7, 2012, only hours after Father's
last gift of marijuana, Son found and took a meth pipe lying in plain view in
the front room. Son then immediately went straight to Father's drawerwhere he knew Father kept his drugs-and he took and smoked the
marijuana and meth that he found there. At the same time, Son took and
smoked marijuana and meth that he found in Father's girlfriend's purse.
He also took and used a meth pipe that he found in the purse.

This

evidence was more than enough from which a reasonable jury could find
that Father not only knew about Son's drug use, but encouraged and
consented to it.
II: The trial court correctly denied Father's motion to arrest judgment
where he presented no evidence that a State witness had contact with the
jury. The only direct witnesses here- the officer and the bailiff- denied any
contact with the jury. The affiants' statements of hearing the bailiff say that
the jurors had a question for the officer did not establish that the officer
responded by going into the jury room to speak with the jury.
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Any

inference that the officer did so was rebutted by both the officer's and
bailiff's statements that no contact had occurred.
This Court should not consider Father's claim that the trial court
incorrectly relied on hearsay in the State's affidavit because Father invited
any error in the trial court considering it and he inadequately briefed this
argument.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FATHER'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND SUBMITTED
THE CASE TO THE JURY

Father claims that the trial court wrongly denied his motion for a
directed verdict because "[n]o evidence supported the charge that [he]
knowingly or intentionally caused or permitted the son to be exposed to
marijuana and meth." Br.Aplt. 9. Father specifically argues that the State
failed to prove the second element-"caused or permitted" -because "no
evidence established that [Father] consented expressly or formally to the
son stealing from a houseguest' s purse" and "no reasonable juror could
have concluded that [Father] consented expressly or formally to the son
being able to access drugs kept in a closed drawer in [Father]'s bedroom."
Br.Aplt. 16-17, 21.
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As shown below, the trial court properly exercised its duty to submit
the case to the jury because the State presented more than sufficient
evidence on each element of child endangerment.

A. The directed verdict standard.
When moving for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, a_
defendant asserts that the State has produced evidence so lacking and
unbelievable that the trial court cannot submit the case to the jury for
consideration, but must instead direct judgment in the defendant's favor.

See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,236 (Utah 1992); Black's Law Dictionary (9 th
ed. 2009). When presented with a motion for a ~irected verdict, the trial
11

court must therefore consider whether the State has established a prima
fade case against the defendant by producing believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r29, 84 P.3d
1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

If the state has

established a prima fade case, the trial court will submit the case to the jury
for it to determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at if 33.
A prima fade case can be made from "any evidence, however slight
or circumstantial," as long as it "tends to show the guilt of the crime
charged.... " Id. at ,r33 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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When assessing the evidence, the trial court must view it, and all reasonable
inferences therefrom, "in the light most favorable to the state." Montoya,
2004 UT 5, ,I29. The trial court moreover is "not permitted to weigh the
evidence, but must only determine whether there is a question of material
fact for the jury to consider." Young v. Fire Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 115, 134,
182 P.3d 911. See also Montoya, 2004 UT 5, if32 ("the court is not free to
weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose
prerogative it is to judge the facts." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
Consequently, "[i]f there is any evidence, however slight or
circumstantial, which tends to show the guilt of the crime charged ... it is
the trial court's duty to submit the case to the jury." Montoya, 2004 UT 5,
~33 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This is so even if the evidence is not "particularly persuasive." Young,
2008 UT App 115, 134. "[E]ven if a judge subjectively concludes, following
the presentation of a the prosecution's case, that there is reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt, the judge is nevertheless obligated to submit the
case to the jury if the evidence is sufficient that a reasonable jury could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,
113, 20 P.3d 300.
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In other words, a trial court "is justified in granting a directed verdict
only if, after examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict
in the non-moving party's favor." Merino v. Albertson's, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 13,
975 P.2d 467 (emphasis added).
Thus, the trial court here could have granted Father's motion for a
directed verdict only if it found that the State had presented no believable
evidence that tended to show Father's guilt of the elements of child
endangerment.

See Merino, 1999 UT 14, if 3; Montoya, 2004 UT 5, if 33.

Because the State presented competent evidence on all the statutory
elem.ents of child endangerment, the trial court properly denied Father's
motion.

B.

The statutory elements of child endangerment.
The elements of child endangerment as charged in this case were that

Father: (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) caused or permitted.Son, (3) to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled
substance or paraphernalia. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp.
2012). The information alleged that the conduct for both counts occurred
"on or about February 7, 2012." R.1-3.
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1. Knowingly or intentionally.
The first element of child endangerment requires "knowing" or
"intentional" conduct.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp.

2012). Utah statute defines the terms "knowingly" and "intentionally." See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (West Supp. 2012). A person acts "[k]nowingly,
or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or
the existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (West Supp.
2012). Likewise, a person acts "knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably
certain to ca use the result." Id.
A person acts "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (West Supp. 2012).
As will be discussed in Section C below, the State presented sufficient
evidence in its case-in-chief to show that Father acted at least knowingly.
2. Caused or permitted.

The second element of child endangerment is "caused or pennitted."
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp. 2012). Utah statute does not
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define the terms "caused" or "permitted." When a term is not defined,
courts will "give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning." State v. Terwilliger, 1999 UT App 337, ,r10, 992_P.2d 490. See also

State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, if 16, 137 P.3d 726 (holding courts will "'give effect
to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning"') (quoting
C. T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ,I9, 977 P.2d 479)).

To determine the ordinary and accepted meaning of statutory terms,
courts often look to the dictionary. See, e.g., Terwilliger, 1999 UT App 337,
,r11 (using Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to determine
ordinary and accepted meaning of "permit"); State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d
492, 494 (Utah 1993) (using Webster's Third International Dictionary to
determine ordinary and accepted meaning of "receipt"); State v. Holm, 2006
UT 31, if19, 137 P.3d 726 (using Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary to
determine ordinary and accepted meaning of "marry"); State v. Gallegos,
2007 UT 81, ,13, 171 P.3d 426 (using Black's Law Dictionary to determine
ordinary and accepted meaning of "expose").
"In addition, [courts] construe the statute to give effect to legislative
intent in so far as possible, and in doing so, assume the legislature used each
term advisedly .... " Masciantonio, 850 P.2d at 493 (citation and internal
quotation mar ks omitted).
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The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines "permit" as "to
make possible" or "to give an opportunity."
Dictionary,

Merriam-Webster Online

http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /permit

visited April 15, 2014).

(last

This Court has also defined "permit" in the

analogous context of contributing to the delinquency of a minor as "active
or knowing acquiescence." Terwilliger, 1999 UT App 337, ,Ill.
The

Merriam-Webster Online

Dictionary

defines

"something that brings about an effect or a result."

"cause"

as

Merriam-Webster

Online Dictionary, http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ cause
(last visited April 14, 2014).
Despite the ordinary and accepted meanings of "cause" and "permit,"
Father argues for narrower, more limited definitions. See Br.Aplt.14-16. The
jury instructions in this case provided that "'permit means to consent to
expressly or formally"' and "caused" means "compel[ling] by command,
authority, or force."

R.107 (Jury Instr. 30) (attached at Addendum C).

Father thus asserts that "pennit" in this case can only mean "consenting to
expressly or formally" and "caused" can only mean "compel[ling] by
command, authority, or force." Br.Aplt.16.
These definitions are too narrow and do not control on this appeal.
First, these crabbed definitions, - beyond being much narrower than the
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terms' ordinary meanings - do not give effect to the legislative intent of the
statute. In 2000, the Utah State Legislature passed the endangerment of a
_child statute to protect children from the dangers of drugs in their homes.

See Stephen L. Nelson, Kort C. Prince, and Marjean Searcy, Families in
Crisis, Challenges for Policymakers: Examining the Troubled Lives of Drug-

Endangered Children, 36 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 81, 81-82, 89-91 (2010). Meth has
been "aptly described ... as the most malignant, addictive drug known to
mankind." Id. at 87. Methamphetamine use causes "substantial damage to
the heart and brain cells and can result in serious physical disfigurement,
hallucinations and delusions, and death."

Id.

Moreover, "[c]hildren

exposed to methamphetamine suffer ear, eye, nose, and throat problems,"
II

are .,, at risk for pulmonary conditions," and can absorb methamphetamine
or toxic substances through their skin following contact with contaminated
surfaces." Id. at 87-88. Children thus living in "drug endangered" homes
"typically live in poverty and in dangerous and unhealthy home
environments." Id. at 111.
Father thus got an unwarranted benefit when he received jury
instructions that unduly narrowed the meaning of the statutory terms. But
more importantly, those definitions do not control on this appeal because
Father does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's
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verdict. Instead, he contests only the trial court's denial of his motion for a
directed verdict.

See Br.Aplt.9-21.

'When Father moved for a directed

verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief, the jury instructions had not
yet been given. R.175:81. And Father did not argue below that the trial
court should limit its consideration of the statutory elements to the
definitions later given in the jury instructions. Instead, Father argued that
the Terwilliger case-which defined "permit'' as "active or knowing
acquiescence" -was relevant. R.175:83. Moreover, the prosecutor argued
consistently with that definition that the drugs "were exactly where [Son]
knew they would be from watching the defendant use drugs and store his
drugs in the past.

That's a common sense definition of permitting."

R.175:82. The crabbed definitions in the jury instructions are thus irrelevant
in analyzing whether the trial court properly denied Father's motion for a

directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury.
But, in any event, as explained below in section C, the State presented
sufficient evidence to show "cause or permit" under either the ordinary and
accepted meanings of the terms or under Father's narrow, limited
definitions: Father "caused or permitted" Son to be exposed to, to inhale, to
ingest drugs or have contact with drug paraphernalia.
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3. To be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact
with drugs or paraphernalia.
The third element of child endangerment is "to be exposed to, to
ingest or inhale, or to have contact with drugs or paraphernalia." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp. 2012).

The child endangerment

statute defines " [e]xposed to" as "able to access or view an unlawfully
possessed ... controlled substance" or "has the reasonable capacity to
access drug paraphernalia[.]"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.S(l)(e) (West

Supp. 2012). See also Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ,r11 ("We conclude that for a
child to be 'exposed to' ... the child must have a reasonable capacity to
actually access or get to the substances or paraphernalia or to be subject to
its harmful effects, such as by inhalation or touching.").
The child endangerment statute does not define "ingest," "inhale," or
"contact." But the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines "ingest" as
"to take into your body."

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /ingest (last visited April 14,
2014).

It defines "inhale" as "to breathe in."

Dictionary,

Merriam-Webster Online

http://www.1nerriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ inhale

visited April 14, 2014).
Merriam-Webster

(last

It defines "contact" as "a state of touching."

Online

Dictionary,

http:/ /www.merriam-

webster.~on1/ dictionary/ contact (last visited April 14, 2014).

-22-

As discussed in Section C, the State presented sufficient evidence
under the third element as well.
C. The evidence was more than sufficient on each element of
child endangerment for the trial court to send the case to the
jury.

In its case-in-chief, the State presented sufficient, competent evidence
that Father intentionally or knowingly caused or permitted Son to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to come in contact with drugs or
paraphernalia.
Below, Father did not argue to the trial court that the evidence was
insufficient to show that Father did not know of Son's drug use or that Son
was not exposed to drugs and paraphernalia. Rather, Father argued only
that he did not intentionally or knowingly cause or permit Son to take the
drugs from his drawer and his girlfriend's purse.

See R.175:81-83.

He

reasoned that because Son "was sneaking around trying to wake up
whoever was sleeping in bed, [it] certainly shows that he does not have
permission to be doing what he was doing." R.175:81.
The trial court did not break Father's argument down, but generally
found that the evidence was more than sufficient on both counts: "Based on
the evidence present in the State's case in chief, I find that the State has met
its burden and that there has been sufficient evidence presented from which
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a jury accurately and reasonably could convict the defendant and so the
motion is denied."

R.175:83-84.

As shown below, the trial court was

correct.
1. The evidence showed Father acted knowingly or
intentionally.
The State presented sufficient evidence to show that Father acted at
least knowingly. As stated, a person acts "[k]nowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (West Supp. 2012). Likewise,
a person acts "knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result." Id.
Here, Father not only knew of Son's drug use, but he encouraged and
enabled it. He repeatedly gave Son marijuana. R.175:12-14, 19, 25, 42-45.
Rather than discourage Son's use of marijuana, he warned him only not to
get caught. R.175:25. Father and his friends openly used drugs in front of
Son. R.175:12-14. Father and his friends left drugs and paraphernalia in
plain view and where Son could easily access them. R.175:17-18, 20, 32, 34.
Son testified that he knew where Father kept his drugs - an unlocked
drawer in Father's room. R.175:17, 34. Father therefore knew that Son had
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access to drugs and paraphernalia in the home. Indeed, when interviewed
at the hospital, Father acknowledged that it was possible that Son could
have found marijuana and meth in his home. R.175:73-74. Father was thus
aware that his conduct was "reasonably certain to cause the result" of Son
being able to access, see, touch, ingest, or inhale drugs or paraphernalia. See
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-112.5(2) (West Supp. 2012).

2. The evidence showed Father "caused or permitted."
The State further presented sufficient evidence on the element of
"caused or permitted." Whether "caused or permitted" is defined in its
ordinary and accepted 1neaning as "make possible," "give an opportunity,"
"knowing acquiescence," or "bring[ing] about an effect or a result" or in
Father's narrow, limited definition of "consent[ing] to expressly or
formally" or "compel[ling] by command, authority, or force," the State
presented sufficient evidence on this element. See Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary,

Terwilliger,

http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary /permit;

1999

UT

App

337,

,Ill

(defining

"permit");

http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ cause; Br.Aplt.12-16. The
State presented evidence of "caused or permitted" in three ways.
First, drug use in the home was open, prevalent, and attractive to
Son. "[A]lmost everybody that came over to [the] house" used meth and
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marijuana. R.175:12-13. Father and his friends used drugs in front of Son.
R.175:12-14. Son likely inhaled the smoke of the drugs used in front of him.
And Son not only observed their use, but demonstrated his interest in the
drugs by asking Father and his friends questions.

R.175:14.

answered Son's questions and discussed the drugs with him.

Father
R.175:14.

Father, however, did not counsel Son about the dangers of drug use or
explain what drugs can do to your body. R.175:27-28. Nor did he otherwise
discourage Son from using drugs.

Instead, Father regularly gave Son

marijuana to use and told Son not to get caught so that Father would not get
in trouble. R.175:25.

And Father knew Son wanted to - and did - try the drugs he saw
Father and his friends using.

Son demonstrated his interest by asking

Father and his friends questions and discussing the drugs with them.
R.175:14. Son testified that he tried meth because he was "curious and []
wanted to know what it was like because I thought it would be cool if I did
it." R.175:15-16. Using the drugs gave Son a "[g]ood feeling" and "made

[him] feel cool. ... " R.175:16.
Indeed, Father encouraged Son to use drugs.

As stated, Father

repeatedly gave him marijuana. R.175:13. Shane gave him meth and a pipe.
R.175:15, 21. Son testified that he did not feel guilty taking the drugs he
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found in his Father's drawer or his girlfriend's purse. R.175:41. This is
hardly surprising given Father's active encouragement of Son's marijuana
use.
At a minimum, this amounted to Father's "express or formal consent"
to Son being exposed to, to ingesting, inhaling, or coming in contact with
drugs or paraphernalia.
Second, Father also provided an environment where Son had ready
access to drugs and drug paraphernalia. Father and his friends gave Son
drugs and modeled how to use them. R.175:13, 15, 21. They also left drugs
and paraphernalia lying in plain view in the house. R.175:20. Furthermore
Son observed how Father and his friends used the drugs. R.175:12-15. As a
result, Son knew what meth and marijuana looked like, where they were
kept in the house, and how to use them.
When Son went looking for drugs on February 7, he knew Father had
drugs in his bureau drawer.

He testified that he "went straight to his

drawer" "[b]ecause [he] knew that [Father] would have it [there] . . . ."
R.175:17, 34. Son quickly identified the drugs and took both meth and
marijuana. R.175:18-19. And because "almost everybody'' at the home used
drugs, Son ·knew it was likely there would also be drugs in Father's
girlfriend's purse. R.175:12.
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Son also knew how to use the drugs. Son's testimony of how he
smoked the meth and marijuana on February 7 - only hours after Father
gave him marijuana -

showed advanced knowledge.

For example, he

knew to put the meth in a meth pipe. R.175:20-21. He knew to use a lighter,
how to hold the lighter, where to place it, and he knew that he should not
burn the bottom of the pipe. Id. He also knew to use a different kind of
pipe to smoke the 1narijuana. R.175:21.
Again, at a minimum, this amounts to Father's "express or formal
consent" to Son being exposed to, to ingesting, inhaling, or coming in
contact with drugs or paraphernalia.
Finally, despite Father's knowledge that Son was using drugs including meth -

Father did nothing to impede Son's access to them.

Father's friend had told him that Son was using meth.

R.175:44-45.

Although Father yelled at Son for using it, he did nothing to block Son from
accessing drugs in his home. R.175:44-45, 52-53. Instead, he kept his stash
in a readily accessible place-his unlocked bureau drawer where Son knew

he kept his drugs. Father continued to allow drug users in the home, even
though these "friends" had given Son meth and drug paraphernalia.
R.175:12-13, 15, '18, 21, 53. Father continued to allow these drugs users to

smoke marijuana and meth in front of Son.
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R.175:12-14.

Father even

continued to give Son drugs, giving him marijuana just hours before Son
took Father's drugs. R.175:13, 54.
And Father continued to keep his drugs where Son knew where they
were. R.175:17, 34. Father did not hide them. He did not lock them up. Id.
Father also left drug paraphernalia lying out in the open - Son took a meth
pipe from a counter in the front room on February 7, 2012. R.175:20.
Father likewise did not supervise Son. Son stayed up all night on
February 6, 2012, and he smoked both marijuana and meth in his bedroom
that night. R.175:19-21, 34, 42-43.
Based on this evidence, Father "made possible" and "gave [Son] an
opportunity" to access, see, ingest, inhale, or come in contact with drugs or
II

paraphernalia. He also consented expressly or formally" to Son's access or
use of drugs and paraphernalia. Consequently, under any definition, the
II

State presented sufficient evidence on the element of caused or permitted."
Case law supports this position. In State v. Te1williger - which Father
cited below -

this Court considered whether the defendant had

"permit[ted] a minor to consume an alcoholic beverage" under the
contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute. 1999 UT App 337, ,IS
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 78-3a-801(1){d)(ii) (West Supp. 1999)). Defining
"pennit" as" active or knowing acquiescence," the Terwilliger court held that
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"permit" requires "some measure of control or participation...." Id. at ,r11.
Thus, a defendant cannot merely "see[] others violate the law[,]" but must
contribute in some way by "ha[ving] some measure of control over the
minors' consumption of alcohol." Id. at ,r12.
This Court reversed Terwilliger's conviction because the trial court
had made no finding indicating that the defendant had any control over the
minors' consumption. 4

Id.

The only evidence was that the drinking

occurred at a party at an outdoor lake at which Terwilliger was also present.

Id. at ,r,r2-4, 12. There was no evidence of the relationship between the
parties or whether the defendant had provided the alcohol. Id.
In contrast, Father here "had some measure of control" over Son's
exposure to drugs and paraphernalia. Id. at if 12. Son was his child, whom
he had a right and legal duty to supervise and control. Son's exposure
occurred in Father's home. Father had control of whom and what was
brought into the home. Indeed, the drugs and paraphernalia ·were either
Father's or his friends' -

whom he had invited into his home.

Thus,

Terwilliger supports the conclusion that .Father "permitted" Son to be
exposed to the drugs.
4

The Terwilliger court named defendant an "adult minor," someone
who is between the ages of 18 and 21. 1999 UT App 337, ,r3 & n.1. The
minors in the case were under 18. Id.
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This conclusion is also supported by State v. Wheeler, 2005 UT App
255U. There, a father was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of
his minor son, when the son twice visited his father instead of going to
school as required by an agreement with Youth Corrections. Id. at *1. This
Court affirmed Wheeler's conviction for "knowingly caus[ing]" his son's
delinquency. Id. This Court found that the "evidence reflects that Wheeler
knew or should have known that by allowing the two separate visits ... he
caused or encouraged the son to violate the agreement with Youth
Corrections." Id. at *2. Likewise, Father here "caused" Son's exposure to
the drugs and paraphernalia because Father "knew or should have known"
that Son had access to the drugs and was influenced to use them by Father.

Id.
The evidence was thus sufficient under the element of "caused or
permitted" to submit the case to the jury.
3. The evidence showed Son was exposed to, ingested or
inhaled drugs or had contact with drugs or paraphernalia.
The State also presented sufficient evidence that Son was exposed to,
ingested or inhaled drugs, or had contact with drugs or paraphernalia. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.S(l)(e) (West Supp. 2012); Gallegos, 2007 UT 81,
ifll. Indeed, Son "ingested" or "inhaled both marijuana and meth because
he tested positive for both drugs. R.175:26-27, 61-64, State's Ex.1. He also
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had "contact" with drug paraphernalia because he touched and took meth
pipes from the counter and the girlfriend's purse. R.20, 18, 20, 38-39.
Son was also "exposed to" drugs or paraphernalia in the home
because he could see or "reasonably access" them. See R:175.12-13, 17, 20,
34. Again, Father gave him drugs; Father and his friends used drugs in
front of Son; they left paraphernalia out in the open; and Father kept his
drugs in an unlocked dresser drawer where Son knew they were kept. Id.
This evidence is sufficient to submit to the jury that Son was exposed to,
ingested or inhaled drugs, or had contact with drug paraphernalia.
In sum, the State-presented sufficient, competent evidence to establish
a prima fade case that Father knowingly or intentionally caused or
permitted Son to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to come in contact
with drugs or paraphernalia.

4. Father incorrectly attempts to limit the evidence in this
case.
Father argues that the evidence on directed verdit is limited to what
occurred on February 7, 2012, and to the drugs that Son found in Father's
drawer and in his girlfriend's purse. See Br.Aplt.n.3, 11. Father's argument
is misplaced.
Father first attempts to limit the evidence on directed verdict to the
date of February 7.

The information alleged that the conduct for both
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C·.\

~

II

counts of child endangerment occurred on or about February 7, 2012." R.13. But the alleged date of February 7 is not an element that the State was
required to prove. Indeed, by court rule, the State need not even allege the
date of an offense. Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b) (although charging document must
set forth offense charged,

11
[

s]uch things as time . . . need not be alleged

unless necessary to charge the offense.").
And where the language

II

on or about" is used, the State is not

required to prove exact fulfillment of that date. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d
1208, 1213 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted) (holding that State does not have
"burden to prove the precise date of the act"). Accord State v. Distefano, 262
P. 113, 116 (Utah 1927); State v. Wilkinson, 612 P.2d 362, 365-366 (Utah 1980);

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1033 (Utah 1991).

Courts will therefore

uphold several days' variance between the date charged and that proved at
trial. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 201 P.2d 764, 769-70 (1949) (permitting ten-day
variance); State v. Wadman, 580 P.2d 235, 236-237 (Utah 1978) (permitting
three-day variance); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1216 (Utah 1987) ("Our
previous cases have permitted a one- to four-day variance where the
approximation 'on or about' is used").

11

Thus, [i]t is sufficient that the

evidence shows that the crime was committed on a date which closely
[ap]proximates the date charged in the petition." In re R.G.B., 597 P.2d 1333,
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1335 (Utah 1979). See also State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908, 910 (Utah 1978)

("It is sufficient if the evidence shows that the crime occurred on a day that
closely [ap]proximates the day alleged in the complaint"); State v. Lairby, 699
P.2d 1187, n.4 (Utah 1984) (finding that trial court incorrectly sustained
defense counsel's objections regarding specific dates of criminal acts where
information recited language "on or around").
Consequently, the evidence that Father repeatedly gave Son
marijuana - most recently on the evening of February 6, 2012- closely
"[ap ]proximates the day alleged" and could properly be considered by the
trial court when considering Father's motion for a directed verdict. In re
R.G.B., 597 P.2d at 1335.

Father also argues that the evidence in this case is limited to the drugs
that Son found in Father's drawer and in his girlfriend's purse.

See

Br.Aplt.17-21 (arguing that State did not prove Father caused or permitted
Son to access drugs in drawer or purse).Father reasons that the jury was
instructed that "'Count I pertains to the allegation of marijuana exposure,
and Count 2 pertains to the allegation of methamphetamine exposure."'
Br.Aplt.n.3 (quoting R.175:106-107.).

But this is not the only evidence that

the State presented in its case-in-chief. Indeed, Son testified that Father
regularly gave him marijuana, most recently on February 6, 2012. R.175:54.
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~

He also testified that he found a meth pipe lying in plain view on the front
room counter on February 7, 2012. R.175:20. But even if the two counts are
based on the drugs taken from the drawer and/ or purse, the evidence was
more than sufficient for the trial court to exercise its duty to send the case to
the jury. Father argues that he had not given his express permission to get
into his drawer on this particular occasion.

Whether or not Father

consented to Son's taking drugs and paraphernalia from the purse, Son
found both marijuana and meth in Father's drawer.

Thus, both counts

could be based on the drugs in Father's drawer alone.

Given Father's

pattern of conduct which sent the clear message to Son that he had
consented to his use and exposure to drugs - and there can be no dispute
that he consented to Son's access to those drugs in his drawer.

Father

created an abnosphere where drugs and paraphernalia were throughout the
house where Son could both see and access them, Father gave his Son drugs
to use, encouraging him only not to get caught. All of these facts bespeak
that Father knew that his conduct was reasonably certain to result in Son's
getting into Father's drugs and paraphernalia, including his girlfriend's
purse sitting out where Son could get it.
In sum, the trial court properly denied Father's motion for a directed
verdict.

Father has failed to show-and cannot show-that the State
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presented no believable evidence that tended to show Father's guilt of the
elements of child endangerment. See Merino, 1999 UT 14, ,I3; Montoya, 2004
UT 5,

if33. The trial court consequently properly exercised its duty to

submit the case to the jury.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FATHER'S
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT l-VHERE HE
PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT A STATE WITNESS
HAD ANY CONTACT WITH THE JURY

Father next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
to arrest judgment.

Br.Aplt. 21-24.

Father claims that the trial court

"disregarded" "persuasive evidence" of i1:11-proper contact between the
testifying officer and the jury where "each affidavit [had a] clear reference to
hearing the bailiff tell the officer the jury had a question." Id. at 23. The trial
court properly denied Father's motion because he did not present any
evidence of contact between the officer and the jury.
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper juror contact with
witnesses or parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice." State v.

Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985). This presumption arises when there is
any "unauthorized CODtact . . . which goes beyond a mere incidental,
unintended, and brief contact."

Id.

If the State does not rebut the

presumption, the court will reverse the defendant's conviction. See State v.
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Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987) (reversing defendant's conviction
where key State witness had five-minute conversation with juror during
recess).
But where there is no persuasive evidence of contact between a juror
and a witness, no presumption arises and the defendant's conviction 1nust
stand. State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51 ,r22, 982 P.2d 79 (finding defendant "has
failed to produce any evidence which would raise a presumption of
prejudice which the State must rebut."). See also State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880,
886 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding trial court's denial of 1notion for new trial
where defendant alleged, but could not show, improper contact between
jury and witness).
Here, Father presented no evidence showing any contact between the
'\jf)

officer and the jury. See Cardall, 1999 UT 51, if22 (finding defendant failed to
produce evidence of contact between jury and witness). Father's affidavits

.·-.:.

were from persons who did not see any contact.

Rather, the affiants

Viii

witnessed the officer and the bailiff walk through the door near the jury
box. They merely surmised that the bailiff took the officer to see the jurors.
But, as the trial court noted, this door did not lead into the jury room, but
into a hallway. R.176:3 (taking "judicial notice that this door, the one near
the jury box, does not lead into a jury room; it leads into a hallway.").
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Father's affiants did not see the officer speak with the jury. R.152-156. Nor
did they hear the officer speak with the jury. Id. Compare Pike, 712 P.2d at
280 (finding improper juror contact where witness testified to hearing

conversation between officer and juror and officer testified to having
conversation with juror).
The only direct witnesses here - the officer and the bailiff - denied
any contact with the jury. The officer told the State's investigator that "he
had not spoken to any member of the jury in this case at any time." R.158.
The bailiff also stated that he knew "for a certainty" that he did not allow
the officer to speak with the jury because doing so would violate the "rules
of conduct." R.158. The officer and bailiff further stated that they used the
door by the jury box only to access a computer to check the status of a
warrant. R.158-159. As a result, Father has not presented any evidence of
contact between the officer and the jury.
Moreover, the affiants' statements of hearing the bailiff say that the
jurors had a question for the officer does not establish that the officer
responded by going into the jury room to speak with the jury.

Any

inference that the officer did so was rebutted by both the officer's and
bailiff's statements that no contact had occurred.
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This case is like State v. Estes, 176 P. 271 (Utah 1918). There, the
defendant filed affidavits from witnesses who claimed that two jury
me1nbers had conversed with a witness. Id. at 275. The State, however,
filed affidavits fro1n the two jury members and the witness in question. Id.
The State's affidavits "dissipated the possible inference" of contact between
them. Id. Upon review, the Utah Supreme Court found that "if the [trial]
court believed the affidavits of the jurors and those of the other persons
made on behalf of the state, it had no alternative save to deny the motion for
a new trial upon that ground." Id.
So too here. "[I]f the [trial] court believed the affidavit[]" of the State,
"it had no alternative save to deny the motion" to arrest judgment. Id.
Indeed, appellate courts should give '"just deference" to such
determinations "because of the advantaged position of the trial judge" to
assess "events occurring in the court room."

Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ,120

(internal quotation and citation omitted). The trial court here was in the
"advantaged position" to assess "the events occurring in the court room."

Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ,120. Indeed, the trial court here was familiar with the
bailiff and the bailiff's rules of conduct. The trial court saw the officer
testify at trial.

The trial court also likely observed Father's affiants -

Father's family members-during the trial. R.137, 157. Consequently, the
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trial court properly denied Father's motion and this Court should give "'just
deference" to the trial court's "advantaged position" to assess "the events
occurring in the court room." Cardall, 1999 UT 51, if22.
Father also claims that the "court clearly erred when it relied on
unswom hearsay" of the bailiff and the officer in the State investigator's
affidavit opposing Father's motion. Br.Apit. 24. But this Court should not
consider this clahn because Father invited any error in the trial court's
considering the State's affidavit and he has inadequately briefed this claim.
First, Father invited any error in the trial court's considering the
State's affidavit. The invited error doctrine provides that "where a party
makes an affirmative representation encouraging the court to proceed
without further consideration of an issue, an appellate court need not
consider the party's objections to that action on appeal." State v. Moa, 2012
UT 28, ,I27, 282 P.3d 985. See also State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106 ,r10, 236
P.3d 155 (holding defendant was precluded from asserting that trial court
erred in not ruling on his motion for a bill of particulars where he
affirmatively stated he was ready to proceed with trial); State v. Geukgeuzian,
2004 UT 16, ,r12, 86 P.3d 742 (holding defendant invited error where he
submitted erroneous jury instruction).
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Here, when asked, Father

affirmatively represented to the trial court that he did not want an
evidentiary hearing:
The Court: I have received documents from both sides. Does
any - do either party believe an evidentiary hearing or
anything further is needed?
[State]: No, your Honor.
[Father's counsel]: No, your Honor. The Court received the
affidavit submitted, I guess, two weeks ago?
The Court: Yes, I've reviewed all that and I've received from
the State as well.
[Father's counsel]: So I would submit it on the motion I filed as
well as the affidavits.
The Court: All right. Thank you.
R.176:3.
Because of Father's representation, the officer and bailiff - or jurors
were not called or questioned. Compare Burk, 839 P.2d at 886 Gurors
questioned); Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 Qurors questioned); Erickson, 749 P.2d at
620 (officer and witness questioned in evidentiary hearing). Thus, any error
was invited by Father and this Court should not consider this claim.
Second, Father inadequately briefed his assertion that the trial court
erred when it considered hearsay in the State's affidavit. Besides the bald
assertion that the trial court erred when it considered hearsay in the State's
affidavit, Father presents no authority or analysis for this claim. This Court
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should not consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (providing argument
11

shall . contain the contention and reasons . . . with citations to the

authorities, statues, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Garner, 2002
UT App 234, ~12, 52 P.3d 467 (refusing to address defendant's claims
because "[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority."); State v. Marquez, 2002 UT App 127, ~10, 54 P.3d 637 (refusing to
address defendant's claims because they were devoid of any "meaningful
analysis"); Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ~74, 73 P.3d 334
(finding that nominally alluding to provisions without analysis does not
sufficiently raise issue to permit appellate consideration); State v. Montoya,
937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that reviewing court is not
depository in which appellant 1nay dump burden of research and
argument).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

§ 76-2-103.

Definitions

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

§ 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult

(1) As used in this section:
(a)(i) "Chemical substance" means:
(A) a substance intended to be used as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled
substance;
(B) a substance intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance; or
(C) any fumes or by-product ~esulting from the manufacture of a controlled substance.
(ii) Intent under this Subsection (l)(a) may be demonstrated by:
(A) the use, quantity, or manner of storage of the substance; or
(B) the proximity of the substance to other precursors or to manufacturing equipment.
(b) _"Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age.
(c) "Controlled substance" is as defined in Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Drug paraphen1alia" is as defined in Section 58-37a-3.
(e) "Exposed to" means that the child or vulnerable adult:
(i) is able to access or view an unlawfully possessed:
(A) controlled substance; or
(B) chemical substance;
(ii) has the reasonable capacity to access drug paraphernalia; or
(iii) is able to smell an odor produced during, or as a result of, the manufacture or
production of a controlled substance.
(f) "Prescription" is as defined in Section 58-37-2.
(g) "Vulnerable adult" is as defined in Subsection 76-5-111(1).
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b) or (c), a person is guilty of a felony of the
third degree if the person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or a
vulnerable adult to be exposed to, inhale, ingest, or have contact with a controlled
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), a person is guilty of a felony of the second
degree, if:
(i) the person engages in the conduct described in Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) as a result of the conduct described in Subsection (2)(a), a child or a vulnerable adult
suffers bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury; or
(c) a person is guilty of a felony of the first degree, if:
(i) the person engages in the conduct described in Subsection (2)(a); and
(ii) as a result of the conduct described in Subsection (2)(a), a child or a vulnerable adult
dies.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the controlled substance:
(a) was obtained by lawful prescription; and
(b) is used or possessed by the person to whom it was lawfully prescribed.

(4) The penalties described in this section are separate from, and in addition to, the
penalties and enhancements described in Title 58, Occupations and Prof~ssions.

Utah R. Crim P. 4. - Prosecution of Public Offenses
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute
or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the ·
defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a
statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged
where appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and
ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as
money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be
described by any name or description by which they are generally known or by which
they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such
things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor
matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or
information.
(d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before trial has
commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. If an
additional or different offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary
hearing on that offense as provided under these rules and any continuance as necessary
to meet the amendment. The court may permit an indictment or information to be
amended after the trial has commenced but before verdict if no additional or different
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After
verdict, an indichnent or information may be amended so as to state the offense with
such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare
his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the
court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of
particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject
to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of
particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(£) An indichnent or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained
therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.

(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the
statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment
or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based
shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed.Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity
but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon
request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish
the names of other wib1esses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before
the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.

Utah R. App P. 24. - Briefs
(a) Brief of th~ appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(l) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate
page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel
citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the
brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation,is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of
the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact
and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall
be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It
shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the ~ial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's
fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for
such an award.
(a)(lO) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under
this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so

makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the
addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(1l)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion;
in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or
the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(l) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if
the appellee has cross.-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of
the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as
appellant" and appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the
lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive
terms such as "the employee," the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the
original record as paginated pursuant toRule ll(b) or to pages of any statement of the
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(£) or 11(g).
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right
corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the
exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence
was identified, offered, and received. or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs.
(f)(l) Type-volume limitation.
11
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(f)(l)(A) A principal brief is acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it
uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text; and a reply brief
is acceptable if it contains no more than 7,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and
contains no more than 650 lines of text.
(f)(l)(B) Headings, footnotes and quotations count toward the word and line
limitations, but the table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this
rule do not count toward the word and line limitations.
(f)(l)(C) Certificate of compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(£)(1) must include a
certificate by the attorney or an unrepresented party that the brief complies with the
type-volume limitation. The person preparing the certificate may rely on the word or
line count of the word processing system used to prepare the brief. The certificate must
state either the number of words in the brief or the number of lines of monospaced type
in the brief.
(f)(2) Page limitation. Unless a brief complies with Rule 24(£)(1), a principal brief shall not
exceed 30 pages, and a reply brief shall not exceed 15 pages, exclusive of pages
containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing
statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this
rule.
In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first
filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise
agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs.
(g)(l) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised
in the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present
the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of
Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to
the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(g)(S) Type- Volume Limitation.
(g)(5)(A) The appellant's Brief of Appellant is acceptable if it contains no more than
14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text.
(g)(5)(B) The appellee's Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it contains
no more than 16,500 words or it uses a monospaced face and contains no more than
1,500 lines of text.

(g)(5)(C) The appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee is
acceptable if it contains no more than 14,000 words or it uses a monospaced face and
contains no more than 1,300 lines of text.
(g)(5)(D) The appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant is acceptable if it contains no
more than half of the type volume specified in Rule 24(g)(5)(A).
(g)(6) Certificate of Compliance. A brief submitted under Rule 24(g)(5) must comply with
Rule 24(£)(1 )(C).
(g)(7) Page Limitation. Unless it complies with Rule 24(g)(5) and (6), the appellant's Brief
of Appellant must not exceed 30 pages; the appellee 1s Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, 35 pages; the appellant's Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of CrossAppellee, 30 pages; and the appellee's Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, 15 pages.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for
good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the page,
word, or line limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to
be briefed, the number of additional pages, words, or lines requested, and the good
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days prior to the date the
brief is due or seeking three or fewer additional pages, 1,400 or fewer additional words,
or 130 or fewer lines of text need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion
filed within seven days of the date the brief is due and seeking more than three
additional pages, 1,400 additional words, or 130 lines of text shall be accompanied by a
copy of the finished brief. If the motion is granted, the responding party is entitled to an
equal number of additional pages, words, or lines without further order of the
court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the
court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal,
any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply
briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed
in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of
Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state the reasons for the
supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any response
shall be made within seven days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be .

disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
®
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INSTRUCTION NO.

i<

Before you can convict the defendant, Darryl Kenneth Bossert of the offense of
Endangerment of Child, as charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from all of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that
offense:
1

That on or about February 7, 2012, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah;

2

The defendant, Darryl Kenneth Bossert;

3

Knowingly, or intentionally;

4

Caused or permitted a child;

5

To be exposed to, to ingest, to inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance

or drug paraphernalia.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case you are convinced of the truth
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty of Endangerment

or Child,

as charged in Count I of the Information. If, on the

other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I.

102

INSTRUCTION NO.

'ft

Before you can convict the defendant, Darryl Kenneth Bossert of the offense of
Endangerment of Child, as charged in Count 2 of the Information, you must find from all of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that
offense:
1

That on or about February 7, 2012, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah;

2

The defendant, Darryl Kenneth Bossert;

3

Knowingly, or intentionally;

4

Caused or permitted a child;

5

To be exposed to, to ingest, to inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance

or drug paraphernalia.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case you are convinced of the truth
of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty of Endangerment of-Child, as charged in Count 2 of the Infonnation. If, on the
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count 2.

... -
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AddendumC

AddendumC

INSTRUCTION NO.~

"Cause" means to compel by command, authority, or force.
"Permit" means to consent to expressly or formally.

(j)

(fj.
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AddendumD

AddendumD

1

MR. HILLS:

No, your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

3

Mr. Hanseen.

4

MR. HANSEEN:

s

The State rests.

Thank you.

Your Honor, I'd like to make a motion

at the time, I'd ask outside the presence of the jury.

6

·THE COURT:

All right then.

We have some discussion

7

to take place.

8

the same admonitions apply, do not discuss the case with

9

anyone, even each other, and we will reconvene shortly.

10

So you will be in a brief recess.

And again

Thank

you.

11

THE BAILIFF:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. HANSEEN:

Please rise.
All right.

You may be seated.

Your Honor, I would be making a motion

14

for a directed verdict at this time, both Counts I and II.

15

would argue that the State has not proven that the case should

16

go to a jury, at least on the element that Mr. Bossert

17

intentionally or orally causes -- caused or permitted his child

18

to be exposed to a controlled substance.

19

The evidence that was before the Court today was that

20

the drugs were found hidden out of sight in a purse, in a

21

drawer in the middle of the night.

22

I

The plain reading of the statute requires that the

23

State prove that Mr. Bossert caused or permitted his son or a

24

child or a vulnerable adult to expose them to these drugs.

25

neither caused nor permitted his son access to these drugs

He

81
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2

specifically on or about February 7th, 2012.
There was testimony that maybe in the past there was

3

some exposure to drugs, but on the date charged in the

4

information, the State has not met its burden, and I would ask

5

the Court for a motion for directed verdict.

6

THE COURT:

7

Mr. Hills.

8

MR. HILLS:

9

confined to a crib.

All right.

Thank you.

Darryl Bossert Junior is not a small baby
The defendant, the testimony is, routinely

10

smoked and used drugs in front of his son, had other people who

11

did, told Detective Flores essentially it's possible that he

12

found drugs laying around.

13

weren't locked in a drawer.

14

knew they would be from watching the defendant use drugs and

15

store his drugs in the past.

16

of permitting.

And in fact, Darryl did.

They

They were exactly where Darryl

That's a corrrrnon sense definition

17

If you put something out there where a child is

18

mobile enough, able to reach ai~d get it and you, in fact,

19

created a desire for this drug by giving drugs to your child in

20

the past, that's the very definition of causing or pennitting a

21

child to have access to drugs.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HANSEEN:

Thank you.

Mr.

Hanseen.

Your Honor, finally, I think it comes

24

down to what cause or permit means.

Cause would be the

25

stronger of the two definitions, as I defined it in the jury
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1

instnictions, compelling someone or commanding someone to do

2

drugs.

_,.-,.
That's certainly not the case here.
I think what could be argued is that Mr. Bossert

3
4

permitted his child to access these drugs.

5

happened here.
In fact

6

That is not what

there was a case I found recently, it's

7

State versus Te:rwilliger.

And the facts of that case were, I

8

think, somewhat similar here.

9

people that were drinking alcohol, and the Court of Appeals

An adult was with underage

10

reversed the judge's decision on the bench trial in saying that

11

permission needs to be something more expressed, more formal.

12

You have to consent to it.

13

that you knew were, you know, drinking alcohol is not

14

permitting them to do so.

Just being around underage children

I think the facts of this case are even stronger for

15

16

that.

There is no permission.

In fact, Darryl Junior said

17

that his dad, you know, at least during the meth was angered at

18

him when he found out he was going to be smoking those drugs.
And specifically the night in question, there was

19

20

certainly no permission.

21

Junior testified that to access it he had to, you know, sneak

22

around.

23

whoever was sleeping in the bed, certainly shows he does not

24

have permission to be doing what he was doing.

25

It w~s well-hidden.

And Darryl

And if he was sneaking around trying not to wake up

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

Based on the
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1

evidence presented in the State's case in chief, I find that

2

the State has met its burden and that there has been sufficient

3

evidence presented from which a jui-y accurately and reasonably

4

could convict the defendant and so the motion is denied.

.L,, '"-•~ -..,

5

MR. HANSEEN:

And your Honor, if I could just take

6

one moment and consult with my client about his right to

7

testify.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. HANSEEN:

10

All right.
Can we do it before -- just one minute

here?
Certainly.

11

THE

12

MR. HANSEEN:

13

MR. HILLS:

! will go see if the child is --

14

THE COURT:

All righl.

15

COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

recess.

16

(Recess taken by the court.)

17

THE COURT:

18

presence of the jury.

19

Mr. Hanseen.

20

MR. HANSEEN:

We are back on the record outside the
All parties are present.

Your Hcnor, I've advised Mr. Bossert of

21

his right to testify at this jury trial.

22

advice and choose not to testify.

23

the record.

He's going to take my

I would like to get that on

I will be calling one witness.

24

25

We are in a brief

I'm recalling Darryl

Junior.
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SAMUEL J. HANSEEN (11826)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,

MOTION TO ARREST JUDGEMENT
Plaintiff,
Case No. 121901450FS

vs.
Judge l-IRUB Y-MfLLS

DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,
Defendant.

Defendant, DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT by and through counsel, SAMUEL J.
HANSEEN, hereby requests that this Court arrest judgment for good cause pursuant to Rule 23

of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Darryl Bossc11 was convicted of two counts of Endangerment of a Child by a jury on
May 23, 2013. While the jury was deliberating multiple witnesses recaJl seeing the Court's
bailiff approach plaintiffs counsel table. Sitting at that table was Detective Flores of the Salt
Lake City Police Department. Detective Flores testified as a witness against Mr. Bossert earlier

that day. Witnesses overheard the bailiff inform Detective Flores that the jury had a question for
him. Witnesses then report watching both the bailiff and Detective Flores exit the court room
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;:

'
through the rear courtroom doors, the same doors the jury exited prior to their deliberation.

Shortly after, the jury returned with a guilty verdict.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT SHOULD ARREST JUDGEMENT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE DEFENDANT

WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAJR TRIAL UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 permits the Court to arrest judgment for good cause.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or
upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest _judgmen1 if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the .arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of
acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment
until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just
and proper under the circumstances.

The Sixth Amendment of the Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that ''In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right lo a speedy und public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation;." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah I 985), the Utah Supreme Court reminds us that
both the Utah and the United States Constitutions guarantee the accused a trial by an impartial
jury. This is found in the 6th Amendment and 14th Amendments to t11e U.S. Constitution, and in
.Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution. Anything more than the most incidental contact
during the trial between witnesses and jurors serves to cast doubt upon the impartiality of the
jury, or gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality. Some jurisdictions have held that
incidental conversation between a juror and a witness does not fatally affect the impartiality of
the jury, unless the defendant can show that actual prejudice may have resulted from the contact.
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The Utah Supreme Court, however, has enunciated a somewhat more stringent rule in
recognition of the fact that prejudice may well exist even though it is not provable and even
though a person who has been tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize that fact. The Utah
rule is that improper juror contact with a witness or a party to the case raises a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice. Id. at 279-280.
The Court in Pike upheld the doctrine that says a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
necessarily arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial between a witness, an attorney or
any c.ourt personnel and members of the jury, when it goes beyond mere incidental, unintended,
and brief contact. The possibility that improper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she
may not even be able to recognize and that a defendant may be left with questions as to the
impartiality of the jury, and leads to the inevitable conclusion that when the contact is more than
incidental, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not
influence the juror. Id., at 280.
Applying the rule in Pike to the matter before the Court, witnesses in the courtroom will
attest to viewing the Court=s bailiff approach Detective Flores at plaintiffs counsel table. These
witnesses will swear they overheard a conversation between the bailiff and the detective where
the bailiff informs the detective that the jury has a question for him. 1 The bailiff and detective
were witnessed exiting the rear doors of the courtroom, the same doors the jurors exited. A
presumption has been raised that impermissible contact was made between the detective and the
jurors.

The defendant has been left wilh questions as to the impartiality of the jury. The burden is
1

Affidavits have been prepared for defendant's witnesses. Due to the limited time allowed for this memorandum
the affidavits have not yet been signed. Defendant anticipates all of the affidavits will be signed by Monday August
12, 2013. An investigator for defendant attempted to contact members of the jury. The investigator has not yet
received a response from the jury. Defendant will supplement:this writing if contact is made.
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now on the Prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the juror.
This raises the issue of fundamental fai mess under the 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, and Article 1, Section l O of the Utah Constitution, guaranteeing the defendant the
right to a trial by an impartial jury.
The Defendant argues that this was more than an incidental contact between a juror and a
witness, and the result does in fact fatally affects the impartiality of the jury, since actual
prejudice must result from this contact. The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a stringent rule,
which says that prejudice may well exist even though it is not provable and even though a person
who have been tainted may not, himself, be able to recognize that fact. The Utah rule is that
improper juror contact with a witness or a party to the case raises a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice, and such is the case in this instance.
The Court in Pike held that the Defendant had been denied the right to a trial by an impartial
jury, and the appropriate remedy was to reverse the conviction, and remand the case for a new
trial. Accordingly, the Defendant begs the Court to folJow the precedent in Pike, and arrest
judgment in this case.

DATED this

r::.
w

1

day of August, 2013.

SAM
Attorney for Defendant
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I he1;eby declare that I caused to be deHvered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions, this

56:

of August, 2013 to Blake Hills, attorney

for plaintiff.

®

®

@
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SAMUEL J. HANSEEN (11826)
Attorney for the Defendant
SALTLAKELEGALDEFENDERASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

· ··

13 AUG 12 PM ,.•
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DE PARTMEN,

8Y

~r-

'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF TIFFANY LESLIE

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 121901450FS
DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,
Judge HRUBY-MILLS
Defendant.

Comes the affiant, Tiffany Leslie, being duly sworn, state the following under oath and certify
the foregoing is true under the pains and penalties of perjury:

"I Tiffany Leslie heard the Bailiff call back the officer to the Jury for a question. The first time
was during a break the Judge was not in the room. This happened a second time during
deliberation he was called back to talk to the Jury again he said they have another question."

Tiff

2905 est 4 0 South, Apt. #112
West Valley City, UT 84119
801-558-7925
State of Utah

)
) ss.

County of Salt Lake )
Subscribed and sworn before me this

/rJJ.·ll•aay of

~ , 2013.

\

@)

~-

SHILPI CULMER
NOTARY PUBLIC• STATE OF UTAH
My comm. Exp. 09/02/2013
commission # 580160

NOTARY PUBLIC
1
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SAMUEL J. HANSEEN (11826)
Attorney for the Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite #300

Ut:) d1)1'(,
•• 1

13 AUG / 2

,..
PN ~: I I
-'ALT LAKE DEPARTMEN,
By
'

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

~;r--

lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TffiRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
....... _.,. ...
INANDFORSALTLAKECOUNTY,STATEO:fUTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF BIANCA KINNEY
r.:·.

w

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 121901450FS
DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,
Judge HRUBY-MILLS
Defendant.

Comes the affiant, Bianca Kinney, being duly sw~, state the folloVving under oath and certify .
the foregoing is true under the pains and penalties of perjury:

"I witnessed the Judge Bailiff come into the court room and asked the arresting officer to come
back to the Jury because 'they had a question for him' while the Jury was out deliberating while
we were going to lunch."

fj~~

Bianca Kinney
150 West 7200 South,
Midvale, UT 8404 7
Phone: 385-242-3503
State of Utah

Apt#39

·. )

) ss.
County of Salt Lake )

Subscribed and sworn before me this / J, .µ.,day of

~

, 2013.

..

-. ..

15 4

~
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SAMUEL J. HANSEEN (11826)

.. ..,

UJ:;j 1 ,\;D:

13 AUG / 2

Attorney for the Defendant

, .: .

,
·
PM 4: //

SALTLAKELEGALDEFENDERASSOCIATION '~ALT
424 East 500 South, Suite #300
LAKE DEP/l.R rM- ,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
By
t N,
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
~ r1 .:-:-.,,.FRK
,J

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
VERONICA HOLLESTELLE

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 1219014S0FS

DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,

Judge HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

Comes the affiant, Veronica Hollestelle, being duly sworn, state the following under oath and
certify the foregoing is true under the pains and penalties of perjury:

Officer Flores through the closest door on the sou
and was in there for quite a while."

Veronica Holl ell
2905 West 4570 South, pt. #111
West Valley City, UT 84119

801-920-0682
State of Utah

)

) ss.
County of Salt Lake

)

Subscribed and sworn before me this

®

Ir!!.+'- day of ~

SHILPI CULMER
NOTARY PUBLIC• STATE OF UTAH

MV eomm. Exp. 0910212013
commission # 580160

, 2013.

~NdTARY PUBLIC

1
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FR.EI? D!STRiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG 12 2013
SAMUEL J. HANSEEN (11826)
Attorney for the Defendant

SALT LAKE COUNTY

iy------=---

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION

D&1puty Clerk

424 East 500 South, Suite #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF HANNA FARRELL
AND CHRISTOPHER FARRELL

Plaintiff,
vs.

DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,

Case No. 121901450FS
Judge HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

Comes the affiant, Hanna Farrell and Christopher Farrell, being duly sworn, state the following
under oath and certify the foregoing is true under the pains and penalties of perjury:
"I saw and heard the guy in the brown uniform (officer) come out of the Jury room and asked the
witness detective to come back there because the Jury had a question for him. He went to the
Jury room and stayed there for a while."

707 West Mackinac Drive, Apt #l0M
Taylorsville, UT 84123
801-564-9691

Christopher Farrell
707 West Mackinac Drive, Apt #1
Taylorsville, UT 84123
801-564-9691

State of Utah

)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake )

Subscribed and sworn before me this _j_3_ day of A u

G us T

,

2013.

1
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SIM GILL, BAR NO. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
BLAKE R. HILLS, Bar No. 8199
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
~

IN THE MATIER OF

)

AFFIDAVIT OF

STATE V. BOSSERT

)

CRAIG L. WATSON

)

CASE NO. 121901450

~

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

:ss.

/l(dl4

,.ii)

I, CRAIG L. WATSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows:

1.

I am a(n) investigator for the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office.

2.

I am a Certified Police Officer in the State of Utah with over 26 years of

·i)

expierence.

3.

I have training and investigative experience in many types of criminal cases,
including public corruption and misconduct by police.

4.

On August 5, 2013 DDA Blake Hills requested inquiry into this matter.

5.

At a sentencing hearing for defendant Darryl Bossert, on August 5, 2013,
members of his family alleged to the court that his conviction was the result of the
Bailiff in the case allowing the lead investigative officer to access and sway the

jury during their deliberations after a May 13, 2013 trial.

6.

On August 5, your affiant interviewed the lead detective on the case, Tom Flores
(SLCPD). Tom stated he had not spoken to any member of the jury in this case at
any time. Tom does not know, and has never met any of those seated as jurists in
this case.

7.

Tom stated he did go to one of the clerk's work stations with the bailiff to check
the state record on Utah Criminal Justice Infonnation System (UCJIS) to
determine if the defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. He recalled
that there was a warrant for a domestic violence related charge. Tom said this
occurred before a verdict-in the case and may have been during jury deliberations,
but Tom was not sure of the timing. Tom does not recall the name of the male
bailiff who assisted him in checking the computer. He described him as tall and
thin with brown hair and possibly in his mid 30's.

8.

Through the court bailiff supervisor, Aaron Torres, your affiant was able to learn
which bailiff was in charge of the jury for the subject case. Aaron identified
Steve Adams.

9.

Your affiant interviewed Steve on August 7. Initially Steve was not sure of which
case your affiant was referring to, but with some cognitive clues he was able to
recall general infonnation about the case. Steve stated that he did not allow
anyone to speak to the jury as they deliberated; he knows this for a certainty,
because it would violate the rules of conduct and he has never allowed such
activity in any case where he has had a jury in his charge.

10.

Steve is not aware of Detective Flores speaking to any member of the jury at any
time. Steve did recall checking the defendant for a warrant with or at the
workstation of clerk Sara Johnson, but does not recall if Detective Flores was
present when this occurred.

DATED this J)-.. day of August 2013.

~i~

CRAIG L. WATSON
Affiant
STATE OF UTAH

)

:ss.
County of Salt Lake

)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

\,Z,fh day of August 2013.

MELANIE A HALL

(I uv

IIOTARYPUBUC•STATE OF UTAH

...

eomm. Exp. 02/24/201,
Comm1sslon # 606317

.,,,

AddendumG

AddendumG

1

August 26, 2013

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *

4

Okay.

So this is Case No. 121901450.

So we have the

5

ruling hearing on this as well.

And so I have received

6

documents from both sides.

7

an evidentiary hearing or anything further is needed?

Does any

do either party believe

~-

8

MR. HILLS :

9

MR. HANSEEN:

10
11

vi>

'

~

No, your Honor.

The Court received the

affidavit submitted, I guess, two weeks ago?
THE COURT:

Yes, I've reviewed all that and I've

12

received from the State as well.

13

MR. HANSEEN:

14

filed as well as the affidavits.

15

(iJ

No, your Honor .

THE COURT:

So I would submit it on the motion I

All right.

Thank you.

And any objection

16

to the Court taking judicial notice of this door does not lead

17

into a jury room?

18

MR. HILLS:

19

:MR. HANSEEN:

20

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
No.
So the Ccurt will take judicial notice

21

that this door, the one near the jury box, does not lead into a

22

jury room; it leads into a hallway.

23

So that being determined, the defendant moves to

24

arrest judgment alleging an impropriety at the jury trial,

25

specifically that the State's witness met with the jury.
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549

The

3

'4}

1

witnesses who have prepared affidavits on behalf of the defense

2

have indicated that the witness left with a bailiff through the

3

door, which the jury exits from.

4

or she witnessed any interaction between the jury and the

~

No witness testified that he

s witness but only by inference and speculation likely surmising
6

that the door by the jury box leads directly into the jury

7

room.

8

9

~

and the jury, only evidence that the witness utilized the same

10

door that the jury had used.

11

unauthorized conduct is present.

12

personal knowledge testified that no contact between the

13

Detective Flores and the jury took place.

14

have personal knowledge indicate that Detective Flores did use

15

the same door as the jury but that he did so to access a

16

computer in the hallway directly outside of that door.

17

~

There is no evidence of contact between the witness

So here, no evidence of
The witnesses who had direct

The witnesses who

So the Court finds that there's no evidence of

18

improper jury contact that was made, and so there 1 s no

19

presumption, prejudice attaching to that and as such I 1 m

20

denying the motion.

21

So we're ready to proceed then with sentencing.

22

:MR.. HANSEEN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

I believe so.
All right.

And so have you had the

opportunity to review the presentence report with your client?
!-1R.. HANSEEN:

Yes, your Honor.

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
RULING ON MOTION/SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
DARRYL KENNETH BOSSERT,
Defendant.

Case No: 121901450 FS
.
Judge:
ELIZABETH A HRUBY-MILLS
Date:
August 26, 2013

PRESENT
Clerk:
cyndiav
Prosecutor: VO-DUC, GEORGE F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HANSEEN, SAMUEL J
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 5, 1961
Sheriff Office#: 100943
Audio
Tape Number:
CR W35
Tape Count: 10:28-35
CHARGES

1. ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD
Plea: Not Guilty 2. ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD
Plea: Not Guilty -

OR ELDER ADULT - 3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: 05/23/2013 Guilty
OR ELDER ADULT - 3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: 05/23/2013 Guilty

HEARING

This matter is before the court for a Ruling on the Defendant's
Motion to Arrest Judgment, as well as for sentencing.
The court states its ruling on the record. The court finds that
there is no evidence that the State's witness had any inappropriate
contact with the jury and therefore denies the motion.
The court continues with sentencing.
The court finds some discrepancies in the Pre-sentence Report and
orders AP&P to correct them. Namely that the defendant was found
guilty of the charges by a jury and did not plead guilty.
Also, that count 3 was not bound over from the preliminary
hearing and was therefore dismissed.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR
ELDER ADULT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR
ELDER ADULT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
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Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Concurrent.
Restitution
Amount: $18.00 Plu
Pay in b
f of: VICTIM
Date:
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